Corporations Proxies Election Inspectors Have Judicially Reviewable Discretionary Authority to Determine the Validity of Proxies Salgo v. Matthews by George L. Flint Jr.

CORPORATIONS- PROXIEs- ELECTION INsPECTORS HAvE JuDI-
CIALLY REVIEWABLE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE 
THE VALIDITY OF PROXIES. Salgo v. Matthews, 491 S.W.2d 620 
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ refd n.r.e.). 
Jockeying for control of General Electrodynamics Corporation, 
the Matthews faction was thwarted during a proxy contest by a man-
agement-appointed election supervisor who invalidated its proxies and 
votes. Matthews responded quickly with a suit in district court, filed 
before the closing of the proxy solicitation and voting, which sought 
mandatory injunctive relief to · compel the inspector to validate the 
proxies and votes and declare the Matthews slate elected as directors. 
The rejected proxies derived from a decisive block of shares listed on 
the transfer books under the name of Pioneer Casualty Company, then 
in receivership. Under court order the receiver had surrendered Pio-
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neer's proxy to the bankrupt owner, instructing him to deliver the proxy 
to Matthews. The bankruptcy trustee held beneficial title to the shares, 
and a bank was in actual possession of the certificates. The district 
court granted permanent injunctive relief, directing the inspector to 
accept the rejected proxies, to count the accompanying votes along 
with a newly acquired block of sympathetic votes, 1 and to approve 
the election of the Matthews faction's candidates to the board of di-
rectors. Reversed. Injunctive relief was improper since an elec-
tion inspector's discretion to determine the validity of proxies is not 
subject to judicial control. Furthermore, plaintiffs had failed to show 
any inadequacy in the statutory quo warranto remedy that justified the 
extraordinary mandamus procedure. 
Supervision by election inspectors is optional unless required by 
statute, charter, or bylaw, 2 in which case the shareholders, directors, or 
presiding officer usually chooses inspectors. 3 Even absent a formal re-
quirement, any shareholder may submit a motion requesting supervi-
sion. Generally, election inspectors perform the procedural exercises 
of calculating the number of outstanding shares, insuring the neces-
sary quorum, and tabulating the votes. However, inspectors often have 
discretionary functions as well, such as judging the validity and effect 
of proxies and hearing and resolving vote challenges. In Texas, statutes 
govern many of these matters. 4 
The potential for abuse of power and collusion by election inspec-
1. The proxies in the new block all represented shareholders who wished to change 
their votes. The court of civil appeals rejected the Salgo faction's efforts to exclude the 
votes, adopting the generally accepted rule that a shareholder may change his vote at 
any time before the inspectors finally announce the results. Salgo v. Matthews, 497 
S.W.2d 620, 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The rule stemmed 
from a practice by election inspectors of authorizing voters in the majority to cumulate 
their votes in order to counter secret cumulation by the minority. See Zierath Combina-
tion Drill Co. v. Croake, 21 Cal. App. 222, 131 P. 335 (Dist. Ct. App. 1913); Zachary 
v. Milin, 294 Mich. 622, 293 N.W. 770 (1940); State ex rei. Lawrence v. McGann, 64 
Mo. App. 225, 233-34 (1895); State ex rei. David v. Daily, 23 Wash. 2d 25, 158 P.2d 
330 (1945). Courts have used the rule to overrule election inspectors who refused to 
allow corrections. In re P.B. Mathiason Mfg. Co., 122 Mo. App. 437, 99 S.W. 502 
(1907); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61 (1925). Only once has 
a court used the rule to overrule election inspectors who did not allow a change of vote. 
Wells v. Beekman Terrace, Inc., 23 Misc. 2d 22, 197 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Salgo 
was the first instance of a vote change executed by a proxy. 
2. See generally W. GRANGE, D. ScHWARTZ, W. GRAY & T. WooDBURY, MANUAL 
FOR CORPORATION OFFICERS 660-61 (1967); 1 B. MILLER, MANUAL AND GUIDE FOR THE 
CORPORATE SECRETARY 98-100 (1969). 
3. Unlike the corporation in Salgo, which entrusted the election to one inspector, 
most companies use three. W. GRANGE, D. ScHWARTZ, W. GRAY & T. WooDBURY, supra 
note 2, at 661. 
4. See TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.27-.29 (1956). 
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tors led nineteenth century American courts to create the distinction 
between ministerial fuqctions, reserved to inspectors, and judicial func-
tions, reserved to the courts. 5 The earliest court to formulate the narrow 
ministerial view held that inspectors were bound by charter declarations 
specifying voting qualifications; they had only a modicum of judicially 
reviewable discretion in applying the charter standards. 6 Although 
subsequent courts permitted the exercise of more discretion, they were 
mindful of the rule's complexity7 and rightfully grew concerned about 
the limit to which an inspector's judgment might extend before it en-
croached upon the jurisdiction of the courts. The problem was more 
than hypothetical; election inspectors clearly had some discretion.8 For 
example, they were required to make every reasonable effort to ascertain 
the authenticity of a proxy or vote before rejecting it. 9 Ultimately the 
courts decided to draw the line at the evidence-weighing function, re-
taining this for themselves on the ground that inspectors generally lack 
the necessary means for factual determinations. 10 To insure the swift 
resolution of disputes facing inspectors, the courts of several states 
evolved specific election rules. If the proxy is regular on its face, 
the election inspector must accept it;11 if irregular, he must reject it.12 
5. E.g., In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N.J.L. 529, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1882); 
In re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869); Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 S. 
& R. 29, 33, 8 Am. Dec. 628, 631 (Pa. 1819). See generally E . .ARANOW & H. EIN-
HORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CoRPORATE CONTROL 407 (1968); 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCW-
PEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2018, at 108 (perm. ed. 1967). 
Several courts have recently revitalized this distinction. Williams v. Sterling Oil, 
Inc., 273 A.2d 264 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971); State ex rel. Howley v. Coogan, 98 So.2d 
757 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958). 
6. Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 S. & R. 29, 32, 8 Am. Dec. 628, 631 (Pa. 1819). 
7. A plethora of rules evolved to aid in the resolution of this ministerial-judicial 
dilemma. Election inspectors could neither reject nor examine an unchallenged proxy 
or vote. Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730, 140 P.2d 210 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1943); Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860); In re Chenango County 
Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Wend. 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839). Election inspectors could not use 
extrinsic evidence, such as affidavits, in determining the validity of proxies. Williams 
v. Sterling Oil, Inc., 273 A.2d 264 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971); accord, Thompson v. Blaisdell, 
93 N.J.L. 31, 107 A. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1919). 
The courts removed from the inspector's dominion several types of decisions that 
require judicial factfinding powers. Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. 
Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (Ch. 1933) (which issues may be considered); In reSt. Lawrence 
Steamboat Co., 44 N.J.L. 529, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1882) (competency of a voter); In re Lake 
Placid Co., 274 App. Div. 205, 81 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1948), appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 932, 
82 N.E.2d 44 (1949) (genuineness of proxy). 
8. Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61 (1925); Burke v. Wiswall, 
193 Misc. 14, 85 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
9. In reSt. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N.J.L. 529, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1882). 
10. See id. at 540. 
11. Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 1, 10, 20 A.2d 743, 
747 (Ch. 1941); State ex rel. Howley v. Coogan, 98 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. App. 1957), 
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Either determination is subject to judicial correctionY Some courts 
limited election inspectors' discretion to delve into voter qualification 
problems, with a rule that the listing on the company books is conclu-
sive on the inspectors. 14 Others found that the books constitute only 
prima facie evidence, 1 ~ from which a certain discretionary latitude may 
be inferred.16 These rules facilitate nonjudicial resolution of voter 
qualification problems;17 without them, the salutary effect of the narrow 
ministerial view might be altogether lost. 
cert. denied, 101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958). 
12. See Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 1, 10, 20 A.2d 
743,747 (Ch. 1941) (dictum) . 
13. In re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869). Despite the general judge-
made rule that makes proxy rejection a ministerial matter, inspectors have often exer-
cised considerable discretion in determining whether the proxy is regular on its face. 
See, e.g., Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun. 230, 36 N .Y.S. 627 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (requiring con-
sent of all joint owners of a stock share in order to validate the proxy held proper). 
However, it is easier to find examples of inspector overreaching. See Standard Power & 
Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, Inc., 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (1947) (no 
power to pass on forgeries); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61 (1925) 
(improper to reject proxies because of uncancelled revenue stamps) ; In re Cecil, 3 6 
How. Pr. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869) (no power to require affidavits to validate proxies). 
14. In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A.2d 697 (Ch. 1941) 
(for the corporation's purposes, the record owner must be regarded as the one with the 
right to vote); In re Grove Cemetery Co., 61 N.J.L. 422, 39 A. 1024 (Sup. Ct. 1898) 
(exclusive evidence); In re William Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 
161 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957) (conclusive on the inspectors, with the issue reserved to the 
courts). Contra, Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont. I, 409 P.2d 813 
( 1966). In Thisted the special situation in which management could use another 
method to determine share ownership--namely the requirement of approval of all cur-
rent shareholders before another person could purchase shares in an apartment complex 
-authorized the inspectors to diverge from the customary rule and inquire beyond the 
books. One court suggested that the rule relieves inspectors of the embarrassment 
and awkwardness occasioned by the same voter qualification disputes arising at every 
election. Lawrence v. I.N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal. 2d 220, 100 P.2d 765 (1940). 
A better justification is that the rule is certain and straightforward and facilitates the 
conduct of corporate affairs. In re Bruder's Estate, 302 N.Y. 52, 96 N.E.2d 84, 98 
N.Y.S.2d 459 (1950). 
15. In re Argus Co., 138 N.Y. 557, 34 N.E. 388 (1893) (inspectors shall consider 
the books as evidence of the right to vote); In re Chenango County Mut. Ins. Co., 19 
Wend. 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (inspectors have the duty to inquire into voters' qualifi-
cations, but this is usually an informal inquiry assuring that there is a prima facie right 
to vote); Hoppin v. Buffam, 9 R.I. 513, 516, 11 Am. R. 291, 293 (1870) (the books 
are prima facie evidence, and the shareholders cannot require that the corporation pass 
on a disputed right). 
16. See Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966). 
17. To aid in tbe determination under the transfer book rules, courts have fash-
ioned supplementary guidelines. Inspectors must accept the proxy of a transferor listed 
on the books, and they must reject that of the transferee. Thompson v. Blaisdell, 93 
N.J.L. 31, 107 A. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1919); In re Mohawk & H.R.R., 19 Wend. 135 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). Inspectors must accept the proxy of an executor for stock in 
the name of the decedent, provided the executor has letters testamentary issued by the 
surrogate court. In re Cape May & D.B.N. Co., 51 N.J.L. 78, 16 A. 191 (Sup. Ct. 
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A number of states subsequently passed statutes granting elec-
tion inspectors judicial power to determine the validity of proxies and 
settle all right-to-vote disputes.18 Overruling much of the old case law, 
these statutes impose upon the adversaries the duty of attending the 
meeting and submitting proof of claims to the inspector.19 The judi-
cial power granted by the statutes is somewhat undercut, however, by 
these states' relentless adherence to the prima facie evidence rule.20 
Since none of these jurisdictions have codified the companion proxy 
rule, inspectors may presumably reject a proxy that appears to be regu-
lar on its face, but is in fact proved invalid by the contending fac-
tions.21 
When the law imposes duties upon private corporations, injured 
parties may petition the courts to compel the discharge of that duty by 
a writ of mandamus, 22 a legal writ issued according to equitable prin-
ciples. 23 Equity denies the right to mandamus when the official's act 
is discretionary24 or when the relator has another adequate remedy. 25 
1888) ; Elevator Supplies Co. v. Wylde, 106 N.J. Eq. 163, 150 A. 347 (Ch. 1930) (under 
a statute) ; see In re Schirmer's Will, 231 App. Div. 625, 248 N.Y.S. 497 (1931) . By 
statute, inspectors are required to reject a trustee's proxies if they are undisclosed in the 
books. Coolbaugh v. Herman, 221 Pa. 496, 70 A. 830 (1908). Under the prima facie 
rule a bankrupt has the right to vote stock listed in his name on the corporation's books, 
even though the Bankruptcy Act vests property in a trustee. Kresel v. Goldberg, 111 
Conn. 475, 150 A. 693 (1930). Under court order a receiver has the power to vote 
stock owned by a corporation in receivership. Strang v. Edson, 198 F. 813 (8th Cir. 
1912), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 612 (1913 ). 
18. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 2233 (West 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.26a 
(Supp. 1974); N .J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-26 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 611 (Mc-
Kinney 1963); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.50 (Page 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 1512 (1967). The New York statute is typical: "The inspectors of election shall de-
termine .. . the authenticity, validity, and effect of proxies ... [and] bear and deter-
mine all challenges and questions arising in connection with the vote .. .. " N.Y. 
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 611 (McKinney 1963 ). 
19. "See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 408. 
20. CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 2215 (West 1955) (only those whose names are on the 
stock records may vote); ILL. ANN. STAT. cb. 32, § 157.32 (1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:5-8(1)(d) (1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw§ 607 (McKinney 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, § 1510 (1967). The New York statute is representative: "The . .. transfer 
book ... shall be prima facie evidence as to who are ... entitled to vote . ... " There 
are exceptions to the prima facie rule. See, e.g., Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 
147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966). However, Aranow and Einhorn believe that the 
use of the term "prima facie" implies that the stock records are conclusive on the in-
spector. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 386. 
21. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 409. 
22. See, e.g., Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Loughridge, 425 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 
1968). 
23. E.g., Smith v. Grievance Comm., 475 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus 
Christi 1972, no writ). 
24. E.g., Cobra Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sadler, 447 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1969). "Discre-
tionary act" generally presupposes a judgmental determination by an official, whereas 
1437 
Texas Law Review Vol. 52 
Where the issue involves the post-election right to hold corporate office, 
quo warranto, 26 an action brought by the state on behalf of the rela-
tor, constitutes a proper remedy. 27 Texas courts have held that quo 
warranto is the exclusive remedy available to shareholders for protect-
ing themselves against usurpation of corporate office. 28 Other jurisdic-
tions have reasoned that by virtue of the essential adequacy of quo 
warranto as a remedy, equitable relief should be denied. 29 Some fed-
eral courts, however, have found that quo warranto is an inadequate 
remedy when the right to it is not absolute30 or when the aggrieved 
party has been compelled to rely on state officials' discretionary 
whims. 31 The Texas statute is subject to neither objection. 32 
In Salgo a Texas court explained for the first time the nature and 
scope of an election inspector's authority. Texas had no statutory defi-
nition of this authority, nor were there any pertinent bylaw provisions. 
Since Texas courts may not mandamus an officer to control the exer-
cise of his judgment, the Matthews faction contended that the inspector 
had no discretion. In evaluating that argument, the court divided the 
previous case law along classic lines, recognizing both the narrow min-
isterial view and the broader judicial view. The court characterized 
the narrow ministerial view as completely denying the inspectors any 
discretion33 and dismissed it with the remark that it merely operated 
to release the reviewing court from strict reliance on the inspector's de-
"ministerial act" usually implies the absence of this type of judgment. In compelling 
the reasonable exercise of official discretion, mandamus is proper. E.g., Cornette v. Al-
dridge, 408 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, mand. overr.). It is also prop-
erly applied in correcting a clear abuse of discretion. E.g., Hereford v. Farrar, 469 
S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ refd n.r.e.). 
25. E.g., Gonzales v. Stevens, 427 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
26. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6253-57 (1970). 
27. See Whitmarsh v. Buckley, 324 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no 
writ). 
28. See, e.g., Toyah Independent School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Consol. Independent 
School Dist., 497 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974). 
29. See, e.g., State v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
30. Columbian Cat Fanciers, Inc. v. Koehne, 96 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
31. Toledo Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 F. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1913). 
32. See Salgo v. Matthews, 497 S.W.2d 620, 632 (Tex .. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ 
ref'd n.r.e.). 
33. Otherwise, declaring that the broader viewpoint grants a measure of discretion 
would be ineffectual; the obscurity of the distinction would prompt an application of the 
narrow rule. !d. at 627-28. Two New York courts have stated that inspectors are au-
thorized to determine any dispute. Data-Guide, Inc. v. Marcus, 16 Misc. 2d 541, 181 
N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Prigerson v. White Cap Sea Foods, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
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cisions.8 4 Feeling that a corporation must be apprised of the validity 
of board elections as quickly as practicable to prevent temporary paral-
ysis, the court assumed that the stockholders' interests are best served 
when the inspectors resolve proxy and voting disputes. 
The court's treatment of the broader judicial view intimated that 
judicial review of any discretionary error removes the most serious 
initial objection to the judicial viewpoint-the possible finality of the 
inspector's factfinding decisions.3 5 The court noticed that under the 
broader judicial view, other courts did not disturb an inspector's find-
ings unless they were clearly erroneous. 36 It then emphasized that de-
spite its authorization of discretionary latitude, it would reserve full 
power to review both facts and law. Thus, the inspector's findings are 
only initial determinations. Under the court's resolution, election in-
spectors should have discretionary authority to "decide the validity of 
proxies and the right to vote, and they should be protected against man-
damus actions. However, the court did not altogether foreclose the 
possibility of mandamus. The election inspector's function encom-
passes both ministerial and discretionary duties. The court of civil ap-
peals noted this dual role37 and left open the possibility that an inspec-
tor might be subject to a mandamus for the exercise of a ministerial 
function. 
Since good business practice dictates the necessity for prompt res-
olution of election disputes, the court reasoned that the election in-
spector should not look beyond the transfer books for a determination 
of voter qualification. Extensive foraging for ·the owner of beneficial 
title would be costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary, since the bene-
ficial owner has other remedies. 3 8 The inspector's only duty should be 
34. 497 S.W.2d at 627. The same could be said, however, of Texas justices of the 
peace. They serve a judicial function, but their decisions are not binding on the review-
ing county court. See, TEx. CoNST. art. V, § 16. 
35. See 491 S.W.2d at 628. The fear is unfounded. The inspectors' findings of fact 
are usually sustained on the grounds that a new election would be costly, and that even 
if th~ inspectors had counted the rejected proxies the result would be the same. See 
Burke v. Wiswall, 193, Misc. 14, 85 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
36. Umatilla Water Users' Ass'n v. Irvin, 56 Ore. 414, 108 P. 1016 (1910). 
37. See 497 S.W.2d at 627 n.3. 
38. The beneficial owner's remedies had never been spelled out by the Texas courts, 
which left the Sal'go court again in the position of filling gaps in the law. It resolved 
the problem by sanctioning the use of the general remedies granted to the beneficial 
owner in other jurisdictions. For example, the beneficial owner may obtain a proxy. 
ln re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A.2d 697 (Ch. 1941); Thompson 
v. Blaisdell, 93 N .J.L. 31, 107 A. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; In re Atlantic City Ambassador 
Hotel Corp., 62 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (under a state statute). He may obtain 
an injunction to prevent the record owner from voting. In re Canal Constr. Co., 21 Del. 
Ch. 155, 182 A. 545 (Ch. 1936); Haskell v. Read, 68 Neb. 107, 93 N.W. 997 (1903); 
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to ascertain who represents the record holder. If a receiver is in-
volved, a statute gives the holder or controller of the stock the right to 
vote. 39 The Sal go faction argued that either the bank, as the holder of 
the certificates, or the bankruptcy trustee, as the beneficial owner, had 
control of the shares. The court disagreed on the basis that these in-
dividuals held or controlled the shares no more than a transferee. Since 
transferees do not enjoy the right to vote the shares, 40 the court held 
by analogy that the bank and the trustee were similarly not entitled to 
vote. 
The court also had a procedural reason for denying the manda-
mus: the adequacy of a legal remedy. Although the previous case 
law suggested the extreme position that quo warranto would be the 
sole remedy available when an office has been usurped, the Salgo 
court was content to hold only that, in the Salgo situation, quo war-
ranto was an adequate remedy.H It reached this conclusion by com-
paring it with a mandamus. 42 The court asserted that quo warranto, a 
proceeding at least as expeditious as a mandamus proceeding, was a 
final decree that would conclusively banish the opposition. 43 It recog-
nized that in some cases plaintiffs might be unable to prove the valid-
ity of their proxies or to obtain full relief in a quo warranto proceed-
ing, or that the corporation might become seriously disabled in the 
event of a delay in accession by the new board. 44 Had the Matthews 
faction alleged and proved such circumstances, mandamus would have 
been proper; however, they had made no effort to prove the inade-
quacy of their legal remedies. 
Salgo authorizes Texas election inspectors to assume judicial pow-
ers similar to those conferred by statute in other jurisdictions. 411 The 
court of civil appeals, in an effort to insulate inspectors from manda-
mus, granted inspectors substantial discretionary authority. The min-
American Nat'l Bank v. Oriental Mills, 17 R.I. 551, 23 A. 795 (1891) . Additionally, 
he may obtain a mandamus to compel recordation of the transfer. Amidon v. Florence 
Farmers' Elevator Co., 28 S.D. 24, 132 N.W. 166 (1911) . 
39. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.29(G) (1956): "[S]hares held by or 
under the control of a receiver may be voted by such a receiver without the transfer 
thereof into his name if authority so to do be contained in an appropriate order of the 
court by which such receiver was appointed." 
40. Since no Texas court had ever faced the problem, the court of civil appeals 
adopted the transferee rule used in other jurisdictions: a transferee may not vote the 
shares since he is not the record owner. Thompson v. Blaisdell, 93 N.J.L. 31, 107 A. 
405 (Sup. Ct. 1919); In re Mohawk & H.R.R., 19 Wend. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
41. 497 S.W.2d at 625 
42. Id. at 626. 
43. ld. 
44. ld. at 624. 
45. ~ee note 18 supra & accompanying text. 
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isterial viewpoint clearly flouts the authority of inspectors to try the 
genuineness of a proxy;46 hence under that view validity is determined 
by the courtsY Logically, the court's rejection of this view must evi-
dence its intent to permit inspectors to resolve such problems inde-
pendently. Salgo thus assimilated into Texas common law selected 
statutory manifestations of the broader view expressed by other juris-
dictions. The court's treatment of the Salgo inspector provided fur-
ther notice of its intention to enlarge all inspectors' judicial powers. 
The Salgo inspector was a lawyer. The disputed facts were complex, 
and the law was sharply contested by both factions. Yet the court did 
not announce any rule for determining the validity of proxies. In-
stead it sanctioned and approved judgmental decisions by inspectors, 48 
subject to postelection judicial review. Although the court then said in 
dictum that the inspector had made the wrong decision, it adhered 
to the belief that the decision should prevail without judicial inter-
meddling until the conclusion of the election process. 49 
The court's reason for granting this judicial power was at odds 
with its basic premise. If achieving a swift preliminary resolution of 
corporate elections were really the paramount concern, the court would 
have adopted the talismanic rules of the narrow ministerial view, 
thereby simplifying and routinizing the election inspector's task. 
Granting judicial powers to election inspectors only slows down the 
initial stages of the election process since assimilating and weighing 
the possibly voluminous evidence bearing on the issues that inspectors 
must decide is time-consuming. On the other hand, granting judicial 
powers does improve the accuracy of the election, a point that the 
court failed to emphasize. Under the narrow ministerial view inspectors 
must accept fraudulent proxies if regular on their face, 110 a procedure 
that virtually guarantees subsequent litigation. Trusting election in-
spectors with judicial powers minimizes the likelihood of successful sub-
sequent litigation because of the increased accuracy of the election 
results. 51 
The broad discretionary powers granted to inspectors to determine 
the validity of proxies was seriously undercut in the court's decision to 
46. In re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869). 
47. See In re Lake Placid Co., 274 App. Div. 205, 81 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1948), appeal 
denied, 298 N.Y. 932, 82 N.E.2d 44 (1949). 
48. 497 S.W.2d at 628. 
49. Id. 
50. See text accompanying note 11 supra. 
51. The Salgo court probably overlooked this rationale, either because it was inter-
ested in insuring the postelection availability of quo warranto or because it intended that 
the interpretation aid election accuracy. See 497 S.W.2d at 628. 
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restrict voter qualification judgments to a mere examination of the 
transfer books. This transfer book rule was designed to encourage 
speedy resolution of disputes. However, nothing inherent in the rule 
guarantees that effect since after this decision the inspector still must 
determine "who was entitled to act for the record owner."52 The evi-
dence offered to show this will be no more leviathan than the evidence 
necessary to determine the validity of proxies. Furthermore, the proxy 
acceptance and voting process already takes several days; a few more 
would not be overly cumbersome. Limiting the inspectors, but not the 
reviewing court, to the transfer books undermines the effectiveness of 
the entire policy. The only way a challenger may enforce what he be-
lieves is his right to vote is by obtaining a judicial decision, available 
only in a court. The result is an inevitable increase in litigation. In 
contrast, when election inspectors have authority to make speedy, ini-
tially binding judgments, an air of legitimacy surrounds the election re-
sult, and future litigation is discouraged. The loser is better able to 
determine the merits of his cause of action, if any, and the potential ef-
fect of corporate paralysis is substantially avoided. While allowing 
broad judicial powers to determine the validity of proxies, the court of-
fered no justification for denying inspectors the same authority in voter 
qualification disputes. Instead, it implied that it would bow to the 
wisdom of sister states. Texas statutes say only that the books are 
prima facie evidence,53 which is presumably rebuttable. However, the 
court construed the term "prima facie" to mean that the book was 
conclusive on the inspectors but not on a reviewing court. 54 This rule 
persists only in jurisdictions espousing the narrow ministerial view-
point, 55 which the court earlier rejected. Had the court more carefully 
analyzed the election process, it surely would have made the two rules 
52. Id. at 629. Other jurisdictions have adopted a number of rules to help in this 
determination. See note 17 supra. The Texas legislature has also adopted several: the 
executor rule, TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN art. 2.29(F) (1956) (executor may vote shares 
still part of estate); the receiver rule, id. art. 2.29 (G) (receiver may vote shares under 
conditions specified); and the pledgee rule, id. art. 2.29(H) (pledgee may vote shares 
once they are transferred to his name). Salgo adopted as Texas common law the trans-
feror-transferee rule, which states that the transferee does not have the right to vote the 
shares. See, e.g., Thompson v. Blaisdell, 93 N.J.L. 31, 107 A. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1919). The 
inspectors need only determine whether the voter falls within the provisions of the rule: 
i.e., is the voter the record holder's representative? The transferor-transferee rule was 
used in the instant case to divest the Salgo faction of its votes. This discretion is identi-
cal to the judicial power denied by the early nineteenth century courts. 
53. TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.27(A) (1956). 
54. 497 S.W.2d at 629; see note 20 supra. 
55. Two commentators label this rule as a corollary of the ministerial rule. E. AltA-
NOW & H. EINHoRN, supra note 5, at 411. 
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consistent: it would have either restricted the inspector's authority to 
validate proxies or expanded it to determine voter qualifications. In-
stead, in eclectic fashion, the court opted for a procedure that spawns 
barratry (narrow ministerial view) and prolongs the election period 
(broad judicial view)-both of which significantly undermine the cor-
poration. 
In this case a corporate bylaw provided that stock could be trans-
ferred only on the books; this might have reinforced the court's deci-
sion to forbid the Salgo inspector from inquiring further. Whether the 
decision can be extended to cases in which no such bylaw exists is un-
certain. If it is extended, an inspector may be susceptible to a manda-
mus if he ignores the transfer book rule and conducts additional inves-
tigations. Arguably the Salgo inspector's reliance on information not 
in the books fell within the proscribed area;56 yet the court was unwill-
ing to label his action a clear abuse of discretion that required cor-
rection by mandamus. Anxious to avoid mandamus on policy 
grounds, the court probably felt that uncertainty about the identity of 
the listed owner's representative rendered the decision of the election 
inspector something short of a clear abuse of discretion. Normally, 
though, if the election inspector seeks to assume the court's function 
and go beyond the transfer books, he will commit a clear abuse of dis-
cretion, thereby enabling the challengers to obtain a mandamus, which 
in tum inflicts all the concomitant burdens on the corporation. The 
better position would have been to allow the election inspectors to ren-
der a judicial decision. Whether this power derives from statute, by-
law, or common law should be immaterial. 
Granting the election inspectors discretion to determine the va-
lidity of proxies and then asserting the rule that discretionary functions 
are not proper subjects of mandamus did not fully refute the Mat-
thews faction's arguments. They had relied on two commentators, 
Aranow and Einhorn, for the proposition that an aggrieved stock-
holder should always have the opportunity to obtain a remedy before 
the conclusion of the election. 5 7 Aranow and Einhorn based this 
proposition on two cases that allowed a mandamus to issue prior to 
the termination of the election. 58 These cases, however, do not sup-
56. The inspector went beyond the transfer books and determined that the beneficial 
owner, the bankruptcy trustee, was the only party entitled to vote. 
57. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 492-95. 
58. State ex rei. Howley v. Coogan, 98 So. 2d 757 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 
101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 
61 (1925). 
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port the point for which they were cited. Rather, they bear on the 
principle that one may secure a mandamus to compel an election in-
spector to execute a ministerial duty. The position taken by the Salgo 
court indicated an intent to prevent the expense of lengthy proxy con-
tests and the concurrent diversion of executive efforts from corporate 
affairs. A quick, conclusive resolution of the contest best serves the 
interests of the corporation. ~ 9 Whether mandamus or quo warranto 
would better serve this policy is not immediately obvious, since both 
involve time, expense, and effort. 
The court's principal ground for preferring quo warranto over 
mandamus started from the premise that the two actions consume ap-
proximately equal appellate time. Given this equivalence, it might 
have felt some responsibility not to vitiate the statutory remedy. The 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have shortened the record-filing period 
for quo warranto, and the procedure is given preference by the apel-
late court. 60 Similar rules hold for mandamus actions. 61 No investi-
gation was made into the time factor in district court aside from a re-
mark that resort to the full range of equitable procedures does not 
constitute a summary proceeding. 62 In resolving this question, a dis-
tinction must be drawn between the situation in which management 
wins and that in which the insurgents win. If quo warranto is the 
remedy, the suit must be brought after the election process is com-
pleted. If management wins the election, the corporation's business 
will proceed as before during the pendency of the quo warranto ac-
tion;63 ·this would have been the case in Salgo. However, if the opposi-
In Coogan the election inspectors refused to allow use of a proxy to vote on an 
amendment proposed at the meeting, yet allowed its use on the subsequent main propo-
sition. The court claimed that an election inspector served a ministerial function and 
was therefore subject to a mandamus. The mandamus issued because an inspector is 
not authorized to limit the use of an unchallenged proxy that is regular on its face. The 
court suggested that the mandamus might not have issued if the proxy's validity had been 
in issue. 
In Young the election inspectors had misplaced some proxies and discovered their 
error only after the polls had closed. They rejected the proxies. The court again as-
serted that inspectors served purely ministerial functions and were subject to mandamus. 
But it required only that they receive the proxies; it reformed the lower court's man-
damus to exclude that court's determination of the proxies' validity. 
59. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 493. 
60. TEx. R. Crv. P. 384, 781. 
61. TEX. R. Crv. P. 385. 
62. 497 S.W.2d at 626. 
63. The old directors would remain in office until replaced. Vogtman v. Merchant's 
Mortgage & Credit Co., 20 Del. Ch. 364, 178 A. 99 (Ch. 1935) (when the attempted 
election of new directors is invalid, the old directors continue in office until the election 
of their successors). 
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tion wins, the use of quo warranto might result in two changeovers 
of management, assuming the suit was successful, seriously disrupting 
the corporation's business. The Aranow and Einhorn solution, which 
allows a mandamus action before the election is completed, might be 
the better alternative. While the suit is pending, the old guard would 
remain in control. Thus, the corporation would suffer no more than 
one management changeover, with minimal damage to the corporate 
routine. 64 Coupling the quo warranto action with a preliminary injunc-
tion might secure the advantages of both approaches. The main appeal 
of the Aranow and Einhorn suggestion is the speed with which it would 
correct an inspector's errors.65 Since quo warranto is a summary pro-
cedure in Texas, the practical significance of mandamus that was rec-
ognized by Aranow and Einhorn is minimal. 
Another policy consideration is the need to discourage litigation. 
The court is unpersuasive in suggesting that a mandamus decree will 
necessarily encourage litigation. According to the Salgo court, quo 
warranto is superior to madamus because the former reinstates vali-
dated officers while the latter merely settles election results. The 
court neglected to mention, however, that absent new grounds for re-
versal, 66 a mandamus decree will operate as collateral estoppel or res 
judicata67 upon both a subsequent quo warranto proceeding and 
further equity suits. A mandamus action will generate further litiga-
tion only if the parties are initially negligent and fail to completely dis-
pose of the issue. Thus, it appears that the two procedures have sub-
stantially the same effect. If instituted prior to the end of an elec-
tion, however, the mandamus proceeding does have one practical draw-
back: some shareholders may be forced to leave the meeting before 
resolution of the mandamus proceeding. 68 Thus, some need does ex-
ist for promptly resolving disputes, and election inspectors appear to 
be best-suited for the task, provided that they are not hamstrung by a 
mandamus. 
64. The court recognized this possibility. See 497 S.W.2d at 624. In quo warranto 
proceedings won by the opposition, courts have issued preliminary injunctions to protect 
the status quo, i.e., to keep management in power. Hand v. State ex rei. Yelkin, 335 
S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ refd n.r.e.). 
65. 'See E . .ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 510. 
66. See 497 S.W.2d at 626. 
67. See City of Gilmer v. Moyer, 181 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 
1944, no writ). 
68. Cf. Burke v. Wiswall, 193 Misc. 14, 85 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Since 
they were excluded from the meeting, some shareholders, for this reason, may have used 
proxies to change their votes in favor of the Matthews faction. 
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None of the reasons advanced in Salgo justify favoring quo war-
ranto over mandamus. Both require the same amount of time, and 
both possess the same degree of finality. The most that can be said is 
that the court's very choice of one remedy over the other may serve a 
beneficial purpose in establishing certainty concerning available reme-
dies. Quo warranto does not have the practical drawback of manda-
mus. Furthermore, as an added litigation deterrent, the state must 
agree to institute the aggrieved faction's suit. Mandamus will be supe-
rior to quo warranto only when a management changeover is involved. 
In that situation even the Salgo court would allow mandamus, assum-
ing the proper pleading and proof of irreparable harm. On the whole, 
therefore, quo warranto appears to be the better remedy. 
Having decided that quo warranto causes the least disruption to 
the corporation and is the preferable remedy for litigants, the court ig-
nored its own reasoning and wasted additional time by dissolving the 
injunction and dismissing the action. 69 In the contested election cases 
in which quo warranto is the exclusive remedy, failure to bring that 
action results in dismissal, 70 although a new quo warranto proceeding 
ii always available if the statute of limitations has not run. Federal 
courts have concluded that a claim predicated on the wrong extraordi-
nary writ is not fatal to the action.71 State courts, however, are reluc-
tant to exercise this flexibility in the absence of a statute. 72 The court 
of civil appeals, therefore, may have missed the opportunity for a ma-
jor contribution to state law in its insistence on formal regularity. 
The Sa/go court amplified considerably the election inspector's 
discretionary authority beyond the limit imposed by American cases. 
However, in following the New York statute's rule confining the in-
69. 497 S.W.2d at 631. 
70. See, e.g., Austin v. Welch, 480 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1972, no writ) (mandamus dismissed by district court); Shaw v. Miller, 394 
S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (injunction dismissed by 
district court); Hamman v. Hayes, 391 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, 
writ ref'd) (declaratory judgment dismissed by district court). 
71. Ex parte Simons, 247 U.S. 231 (1918) (the form of the extraordinary writ does 
not matter); see Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969) (appellate court remanded 
a habeas corpus action to be treated as a mandamus proceeding); Johnson v. Avery, 252 
F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), rev'd, 382 F .2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 
483 (1969) (the district court treated a motion for law books as a writ of habeas cor-
pus). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 54. 
72. See Fins, Should an Error in ..Seeking the Wrong Writ be Fatal?, 4 J. MARSHALL 
J. OF PRAc. & PROC. 188 (1971). But see Ferguson v. Ferguson, 98 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. 
Civ. App.-Eastland 1936, no writ) (designating relief requested as writ of prohibition 
instead of injunction was immaterial). 
[Note by George Lee Flint, Jr.] 
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spector to the transfer books, it created an anomalous split in the in-
spector's authority: he does have discretion to determine validity of 
votes, but he has little or none to determine who may vote. Neverthe-
less, Salgo has also helped to resolve a number of minor dilemmas fac-
ing the election inspector-the problem of changed votes and the status 
of beneficial owners and transferees. Although the court refused to 
grant a mandamus, it did not foreclose the possibility that mandamus 
will lie where the functions are purely ministerial or where quo war-
ranto is inadequate. 
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